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Abstract
In the past decade, a set of euro area countries has accumulated large current account 
deﬁ  cits. After a brief relaxation of the euro area internal imbalances in the wake of 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis, it appears as if this pattern arises anew when times normalize 
again and Germany still sticks to export-led growth. This issue has been labelled one 
of the most challenging economic policy issues for Europe inter alia by the European 
Commission and some other players on the EU level. In this paper, we analyse the role 
of private restructuring and structural reforms for the urgently needed sustainable 
readjustment of intra-euro area current account balances. A panel regression reveals 
a signiﬁ  cant impact of structural reforms on intra-euro area current account balances. 
This implies that in particular structural reforms and wage restraint in notorious 
current account and budget deﬁ  cit countries such as Greece are highly suitable to 
support long-term economic stability in Europe.
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1. Introduction
Since the creation of EMU, the intra-euro area current account balances of euro area member 
states have diverged steadily and significantly. While Germany has seen rising trade surpluses 
against other euro area countries in the years 2002 to 2007, other countries like Spain, Italy 
and Portugal have accumulated large current account deficits. Up to the present, this 
divergence of intra-euro area current accounts seems to persist and shows just slow signs of a 
temporary reversal in the wake of the financial crisis (de Grauwe 2009a; Gros et al. 2005; 
Decressin and Stavrev 2009). Only most recently after the financial crisis has severely hit the 
real economy, intra-euro area current account deficits and surpluses started to shrink slowly. 
However, the impact of national structural reforms and private market adjustment on intra-
euro area current accounts has still not been analysed in the necessary depth. Our contribution 
tries to fill this gap. 
In general, changes of the current account balance of whatever sign are no indication of 
malfunctioning as they reflect inter-temporal saving as well as consumption and investment 
preferences of private enterprises, households and governments (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1994). 
Additionally, business cycles, demographic developments (De Santis and Lührmann 2006) 
and fiscal policy are important determinants of empirical realisations of the current account 
balance. Furthermore, the European integration process certainly affected intra-euro area 
current account balances. In particular, Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal have taken 
advantage of improved access to international financial markets in the wake of EMU. A rising 
expected rate of return (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002), convergence of interest rates (Fagan 
and Gaspar 2007; Mendoza et al. 2007) and a reduced currency risk for lenders tends to 
accelerate domestic investment. 
In contrast, some analysts interpret intra-euro area current account balances as the result 
of diverging competitiveness in the euro area (Arghyrou and Chortareas 2006; EC 2009). 
They argue that the real appreciation due to wage austerity in Germany and rising wages in 
Southern Europe distorted the international competitiveness of Spain, Greece, and Portugal 
(Blanchard 2007). Absent labour market flexibility, a main mechanism to adjust 
competitiveness in a currency union (Mundell 1961), can therefore been drawn upon as the 
main reason for such large and persistent current account deficits and surpluses in the euro 
area (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002; Blanchard 2007; EC 2009). However, this line of 
reasoning has been controversially discussed more recently. For instance, de Grauwe (2009b) 
argues that in the face of the crisis, flexibility represents a handicap for euro area countries - 5 - 
and rigidities are virtuous. His main argument is that rigidities in wages, employment and 
social security allow countries to better deal with the fixed levels of debt imposed on 
households and firms. But the insolvency crisis surrounding Greece and, to a lesser extent, 
also countries like Portugal and Spain highlighted the necessity of a grave austerity 
programme in order to be able to earn more from net exports than a country has to pay for 
interest on the debt burden. Otherwise a country cannot stabilize its debt. Greece is an 
excellent case in point because, for instance, its shipping industry which is heavily dependent 
on the business cycle heavily suffers from a competititveness problem which has been 
aggravated by the financial and economic crisis. Hence, going for structural reforms and a 
nearly 10 percent cut of real wages was the only way out from insolvency for Greece. This 
insight is also highly beneficial also for countries like Portugal which cannot keep their 
capital stock constant any more by the cash flow it generates. 
Up to now, research on this issue of structural reforms and external balances in the euro 
area has been quite scarce. Kennedy and Sløk (2005) analyse the role of structural policy 
reforms for the solution of global current account imbalances for 14 OECD countries. They 
find a significant but small contribution of structural policy indicators to explain current 
account positions. In the same context, Mussa (2005) argues that structural reforms in 
industrial countries are desirable as they might boost long-term growth and hence import 
demand. In the euro area, structural reforms affect the adjustment capacity of the currency 
union as a whole. Therefore, external balances will more easily readjust in the wake of shocks 
in general such as the introduction of the single currency or of asymmetric shocks manifesting 
themselves in diverging country-specific competitiveness positions. This view goes far back 
to the seminal paper by Mundell (1961) on optimum currency areas as well as to more recent 
research, such as Pissarides (1997) or Blanchard (2007). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
pattern of the evolution of intra-euro area current account balances. Section 3 reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of structural reforms and private market 
adjustment on current account balances. In section 4, we estimate the individual impacts of 
private restructuring and structural reforms on euro area bilateral trade accounts in a dynamic 
panel for 11 euro area countries for the years 1991 to 2007. Section 5 concludes with some 
policy implications. - 6 - 
2. Current account balances within the euro area
After the start of EMU in 1999, unexpectedly large intra-euro area current account balances 
emerged. The emerging large gap between Germany (and some smaller countries) on the one 
hand and most other EMU members is increasingly regarded as the crucial issue for the 
macroeconomic and political stability of the euro area (EC 2009). Accordingly, some analysts 
argue that intra-euro area current account balances are determined, at least partly, by 
asymmetric changes in the international competitiveness of euro area countries (Blanchard 
2007; EC 2009). Therefore, we start with an assessment of international competitiveness as a 
determinant of the (speed of) adjustment of current account balances. Later on, we analyse 
how national policies and the international division of labour might have affected current 
account balances.
1
2.1. The competitiveness approach 
From the perspective of competitiveness driven intra-euro area balances, Germany holds a 
relatively strong competitiveness position, for instance, vis-à-vis Spain since German current 
account surpluses vis à vis Spain have been quite large recently. In this context, the real 
exchange rate is the most commonly used measure of cost and price competitiveness 
(Lipschitz and McDonald 1992; Arghyrou and Chortareas 2006). In a monetary union with a 
common currency, the real exchange rate only depends on changes in relative prices between 
countries. A country with low competitiveness needs to undergo a real depreciation and, 
hence, to deflate its general price level in relative terms to regain competitiveness. Domestic 
products have to become cheaper as compared to foreign goods. If this is the case, exports 
increase, imports decrease and the current account deficit is eliminated. Conversely, a country 
with a competitive economy could reduce its export surplus by a real appreciation, for 
instance by increasing wages. This would accelerate national inflation via higher costs and 
prices. Competitiveness in the euro area would be re-balanced via flexible prices and wages. 
                                                
1 Economic integration in general and Eastern enlargement of the European Union in particular created a wider 
European single market, thereby stimulating structural adjustment and economic specialization. Borbély (2006) 
in some cases applies methods quite similar to ours, but takes a different perspective analyzing trade 
specialization patterns in the enlarged European Union with a special focus on the new EU member states and 
the cohesion countries. From a sectoral trade point of view, she presents empirical findings on revealed 
comparative advantage and a broader picture of competitiveness on the single market. Empirically identifying 
the determinants of successful trade specialization and taking into account the role of foreign direct investment, 
she offers new insights into the dynamics of trade, innovation and integration. Thus, our study complements her 
work in increasing our understanding of the nature of international adjustment processes. - 7 - 
The argument that a monetary union with heterogeneous members requires flexible 
markets goes back to the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA). The seminal paper by 
Mundell (1961) demonstrates that members of a monetary union need flexible labour markets 
to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Otherwise, membership in a common currency area is not 
beneficial. Sudden changes in relative prices necessitate a gradual readjustment in the 
enterprise sector to restore relative competitiveness. Note that in contrast to Mundell’s (1961) 
case, the current pressing disequilibrium within EMU has not emerged suddenly through a 
shock, but gradually via persistent asymmetric wage growth rates. The argument is well 
known and runs as follows. 
According to the trade theories of factor price equalisation, trade and/or labour migration 
act as transmission channels for relative wage adjustment. In a country characterized by an 
increasing price level competitiveness, decreases and exports tend to decline (trade channel). 
Competitiveness of the home country is regained by reductions of wages whereas in the 
partner country exports tend to rise and labour demand is boosted which, in turn, encourages 
wage increases. Additionally or alternatively, parts of the labour force migrate from the 
country in recession to the country finding itself in a boom (labour migration channel)
2. 
Labour movement will continue until relative wages and relative prices are re-balanced. Both 
mechanisms only work efficiently if wages are flexible and/or labour mobility is high. 
However, adjustment of competitiveness differences lasts longer, if prices and wages are 
rigid (EC 2008). Moreover, it is more costly in terms of unemployment because in cases of 
downward wage rigidity labour demand decreases (Blanchard 2007). In contrast, the more 
competitive country faces a shortage of labour. In the long run, as unemployment increases, 
the pressure for adjustment in the less competitive country increases. Blanchard (2007: 7) 
calls this way of adjustment competitive disinflation, representing “[…] a period of sustained 
high unemployment, leading to lower nominal wage growth until relative unit labour costs 
have decreased, [and] competitiveness has improved”. Both the speed of this adjustment 
process and the level of unemployment during the adjustment process depend on the degree of 
nominal wage rigidity and the degree of price stickiness. Such a period of competitive 
disinflation has often been argued to have taken place in Germany, where real wages have 
                                                
2 This is the main mechanism through which U.S. states adjust to unemployment. In this context, Wasmer (2003) 
argues that higher labour mobility results from high labour market flexibility. US labour force faces low 
employment protection and invests therefore more in person specific human capital, which enables them to be 
mobile. In contrast, European workers tend to invest in firm specific human capital, which makes them less 
mobile.  - 8 - 
remained widely constant since the turn of the millennium after unemployment had increased 
to historical levels. 
In case of EMU, it is the common monetary policy and the low inflation policy of the 
ECB, which narrow the scope for a competitive disinflation process without any downward 
movements of the wage. Assuming that nominal wage cuts are unlikely, a country with 
lagging competitiveness that holds nominal wages constant can only realize real wage cuts by 
means of sizeable inflation. The lower inflation is, the smaller will be real wage cuts and 
competitiveness gains against other euro area countries
3, and the more the re-balancing 
process is postponed. 
Seen on the whole, thus, downward wage flexibility is - given similar levels of productivity 
increases - crucial for balancing current account balances in the euro area via the 
competitiveness channel. This is even more valid as the common currency has reduced 
transaction costs for intra-euro area trade and has enhanced price transparency across borders 
(Badinger 2007; EC 2008). What is more, the process of globalisation and the rising 
competition from China and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) going 
along with the former, have further enhanced the pressure on competitive as well as on less 
competitive euro area countries. 
Figure 1 displays the development of unit labour costs in the euro area from 1999 to 2007. 
While Germany and Austria almost kept the level of 1999, in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, Italy, and Netherlands unit labour costs have increased significantly up to 30% 
compared to 1999. This implies a real appreciation and a huge loss in competitiveness of the 
former countries which in turn has, according to the majority of studies (see section 3.1), 
significantly contributed to the build-up of intra-euro area current account imbalances. In 
view of the rather large unit labour cost growth differential, this pattern should hold even 
without imposing overly large values on export and import demand price sensitiveness in the 
euro area countries. It is important to keep in mind that these imbalances are driven by the 
private sector (trade unions and enterprises) rather than by the harmonized common 
macroeconomic policies (EC 2009). 
                                                
3 Here we simply assume no real wage cuts in competitor countries. - 9 - 



























Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
From this perspective, intra-euro area imbalances, which are steadily rising from 1999 to 
2008, imply that there was neither wage competition nor wage harmonization within the euro 
area across this period. Apparently, relative wages have not adjusted to diverging 
competitiveness to a sufficient extent and have thus ultimately failed to correct the rising 
current account imbalances. According to Altissimo et al. (2006) this is due to the fact that 
structural rigidities and in particular downward rigid prices and wages in the euro area have 
prevented any significant adjustment of real exchange rates in many euro area countries as 
one of the dominant textbook driving forces of the current account balance. Correspondingly, 
the European Commission (2006) comes up with the result that country-specific unit labour 
costs respond differently to positive and negative output gaps. During an economic downturn, 
the loss of competitiveness is typically higher in Portugal, Italy, Greece, France and Finland 
than in Germany and Austria. In general, this pattern has to be attributed to different degrees 
of real wage rigidity. 
2.2. National inflation and wage policies 
Despite a common monetary policy, national policies of fiscal policy, taxation, or wage 
determination remain heterogeneous across the euro area. This might have contributed to the 
emergence of different country-specific developments of income, consumption, investment - 10 - 
and, thus, also of import demand. What is more, structural differences in wage growth and 
inflation between members of the euro area have persisted and have even increased in the last 
couple of years in the euro area for several reasons. 
First, there are marked differences in inflation traditions and inflation expectations. The 
ECB’s low inflation target seems to be anchored to a different extent in anticipated national 
inflation rates, which is reflected in divergent long-run expected inflation across different 
member countries of the euro area (Hofmann and Remsperger 2005). Along with inflation 
differences having been lower more recently than in the past, wages and prices continued to 
rise in many Southern European countries despite a tighter monetary policy stance in the 
EMU centre. In this context, structural inflation differences just seemed to mirror the process 
of price level convergence within the euro area, as some EMU members such as Greece, 
Portugal and Slovenia continued to catch-up in terms of productivity, the well-known 
Balassa-Samuelson effect.  
Second, differences in consumption and production structures across countries have an 
impact on national inflation. As countries are exposed differently to extra euro area trade, 
changes in the external value of the euro should have a country-specific impact on imported 
inflation (Honohan and Lane 2003; Hofmann and Remsperger 2005). For example, since 
Ireland trades more with the UK than with Germany, a depreciation of the euro against the 
pound should raise import prices in Ireland more than in Germany. Furthermore, countries are 
asymmetrically exposed to common temporary shocks, such as the surge of raw material and 
oil prices due to different degrees of dependence on crude oil (Hofmann and Remsperger 
2005; EC 2006). More technology intensive economies such as Germany tend to use 
relatively less oil per unit GDP than Southern European countries, which therefore have been 
hit more severely by an increase in raw material prices.  
Third, structural differences among national euro area inflation rates might also be driven 
by idiosyncratic business cycles (Honohan and Lane 2003; EC 2006). For instance, after the 
turn of the millennium Spain and Ireland experienced a period of sustained growth while 
German growth still remained sluggish. As a result, the implementation of the common 
monetary policy and the country-specific real interest rate shocks resulting from it contributed 
to asymmetric economic developments (EC 2008). Decreasing interest rates and persistent 
inflation rates reduced real interest rates and boosted demand in former high inflation 
countries such as Spain or Ireland (López-Salido et al. 2005). In contrast, relatively high real 
interest rates in Germany reduced investment demand and kept inflation low. - 11 - 
Fourth and probably most importantly, national inflation rates were driven by different 
degrees of national wage and productivity growth. In Germany, high unemployment, being 
partly a legacy of its unification, restrained real wage growth. Beyond EMU, German wage 
austerity since the mid 1990s represents a consistent response to low wage competition from 
the CEECs and East Asia. In addition, German productivity increased. In contrast, wage 
growth in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece remained high, for instance due to inflation 
indexation in Spain (López-Salido et al. 2005) and/or buoyant capital inflows. Productivity 
growth remained moderate. Furthermore, structural reforms in labour and complementary 
markets were implemented at different speeds and scopes (Belke et al. 2006a; de Grauwe 
2009a). This affected the differential between the country-specific inflation dynamics (Beck 
et al. 2009).  
2.3. Division of labour and industry specialization  
Beyond different degrees of price competitiveness and country-specific economic policies, 
some other factors are made responsible by analysts for the recent pattern of intra-euro area 
current account imbalances. One obvious candidate is the division of labour among euro area 
member countries, i.e. the degree and area of specialization of national industries. For 
instance, Amable and Verspagen (1995) and Ilzkovitz et al. (2008) emphasise the role of the 
so-called non-price competition which covers a large set of variables such as sectoral and 
geographical specialization of the export sector, production and technology structure, as well 
as the quality of products. 
First, a clear pattern of specialization in specific goods and export markets is important for 
competitiveness. A country with a sectoral specialization in difficult-to-imitate goods has an 
advantage which gives - other things equal - ample room for higher relative wage growth and 
vice versa (Ilzkovitz et al. 2008). Additionally, the geographical specialization, i.e. the 
structure of a country’s main export destinations, matters. Export specialization to dynamic 
(emerging) markets will boost overall exports relative to exports to mature markets.  
Second, the production structure determines how and to what extent rising wage costs can 
be passed on to international markets and, thus, for the realisation of a country’s current 
account imbalance. If a country is specialized in the production of labour intensive goods, the 
power to pass prices to international markets is low and international market shares are lost in 
response to higher wages. This is because rising wages are translated to a larger extent into - 12 - 
rising production costs as wage costs account for a larger share of overall costs. Hence, wage 
growth in countries with more labour-intensive production such as Italy, Greece, or Portugal 
might accelerate the loss of market shares relative to countries with capital-intensive 
production such as Germany. This effect is particularly strong in the euro area, where a 
common monetary policy and integrated capital markets provide almost equal capital costs 
(ECB 2008). 
As displayed in Figure 2, the capital intensity of production in the euro area differs 
significantly between Germany, Austria and France at the top and Greece, Spain and Portugal 
at the bottom. Notably, the capital per worker ratio in Portugal is almost one third of the 
German one. Labour productivity of bottom group countries is much lower than in capital-
intensive countries. Theoretically, low productivity growth needs to be accommodated by 
lower wage increases if competitiveness shall not be eroded. The squares denote those 
countries experiencing high relative unit labour cost growth since 1999. They indicate that in 
Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, relative wage growth was not accompanied by relative 
labour productivity gains. Productivity growth in Ireland was very likely influenced by the 
fast growth of the financial sector and therefore can be expected to be corrected nearly 
automatically in the years to come. 
Third, the nature of competition and the heterogeneity of goods matter for current account 
balances. Supply of diversified and/or high quality goods allow a country to claim higher 
prices in international markets as customers are willing to offer an extra pay for special 
characteristics of goods (Aiginger 2000). In this case, firms are able to shift higher wage costs 
to international customers. Such kind of quality competition dominates in high-technology 
and high-skill industries (Aiginger 2000). In contrast, low-technology and low-skill (labour-
intensive) industries mostly compete via prices. In the latter case, excessive wage growth is 
more harmful because competition with low labour cost countries, such as the new EU 
members or the East Asian emerging markets, is much fiercer. With rigid labour markets, 
unemployment tends to rise as a dire consequence and to become structural and persistent. In 
the euro area, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and to some extent also Italy for a long time relied 
mainly on low-tech and medium-tech exports (ECB 2005; Baumann and di Mauro 2007). 
They have suffered from price competition from new EU member countries and East Asia 
(Bennett and Zarnic 2008). Current account deficits have thus gradually increased in these 
cases. - 13 - 
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Source: European Commission, AMECO. Squares mark Countries with relative high ULC Growth since 1999. 
2.4. The role of the non-tradable sector 
Although the divergences in euro area current account balances have become visible in the 
tradable sector, there is a need for adjustment also in the non-tradable sector, mainly for two 
reasons. First, non-tradable goods (i.e. services) such as logistics, IT, construction, personnel 
and financial services are used as inputs for the production of tradable goods. Rising prices in 
the non-tradable sector push up the costs in the tradable sector. Second, price increases in the 
non-tradable sector tend to fuel inflation (López-Salido et al. 2005) which reduces the 
purchasing power of wages in the tradable sector. In turn, the trade unions in the tradable 
sector claim a higher inflation compensation within the wage bargaining process. By this 
second-round effect the production costs of tradable goods increase and the competitiveness 
of the tradable sector shrinks. This corresponds to a kind of reversed Balassa-Samuelson 
setting where rising wages in the non-tradable sector trigger wage adjustment in the traded 
goods sector, which might reduce the current account balance. 
Figure 3 supports this view and provides evidence that the non-tradable sector contributed 
significantly to the striking labour cost divergence in Europe. It displays the cumulative 
growth of sectoral unit wage costs
5 in percent from 1999 to 2007 for eleven core euro area 
                                                
4 High labour productivity and capital intensity in Ireland is due to the financial sector, which will probably 
shrink during the current financial crisis. 
5 Unit wage costs as defined by the European Commission are equivalent to the compensation of employees in 
sector i divided by gross value added of sector i.- 14 - 
countries subdivided by sector. We classify the industry and the manufacturing branch as 
tradable sectors, whereas services and construction are defined as non-tradable goods. The 
black dot indicates the cumulative nominal labour cost growth within the period. In countries 
whose current account deficit has widened since 1999, the growth of unit wage costs in 
services and construction exceeded those in industry and manufacturing by far. In contrast, in 
Germany and Austria unit wage costs in the service and construction sectors have increased 
only moderately which contributed to low overall unit labour cost growth as also argued by 
the European Commission (2006).  
In sections 2.1 to 2.4, we have collected an array of potential determinants of intra-euro 
area current account imbalances. Moreover, we have identified certain areas in which either 
private adjustment or, as a substitute, government initiated structural reforms might lead to a 
re-balancing of the imbalances. Taking this as a starting point, we now turn to a deeper and 
more concrete analysis of the relation between structural reforms, market forces and the 
current account in order to deliver the theoretical underpinnings of our estimation equations in 
section 4. 
Figure 3 - Nominal unit wage costs by major sectors and overall unit labour costs, cumulative 






































































































































Nominal Unit Labour Costs
Source: European Commission, AMECO. - 15 - 
3. Structural reforms, market forces, and the current account 
The quite obvious significance of the lack of market-based adjustment mechanisms in 
general, but especially of labour market flexibility, for intra-euro area current account 
balances puts two questions on the agenda. First, how structural reforms, in particular on the 
labour market, affect the current account balance (section 3.1) and, second, how more labour 
market flexibility can be achieved. With respect to the latter, we first investigate how national 
governments can enhance labour market flexibility by structural reforms (section 3.2). Then, 
we investigate potential responses of the private sector to falling exports and rising import 
competition (section 3.3). This is for what we later on coin the notion of “market adjustment”. 
3.1 Structural reforms and the current account 
There are at least two competing theories on how structural reforms, in particular on the 
labour market, might affect the current account balance. The first one is related to the 
intertemporal approach to the current account (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1994). In our context, it 
would imply the following. Since structural reforms tend to be painful today but promise 
future gains, it would be rational for countries to borrow today in order to compensate for the 
current pain of structural reforms. Hence, the current account balance should decline in the 
short run. However, since future gains of structural reforms will be used to pay back the loans 
in the future, we should observe a reversal and a positive change of the current account in the 
future. However, returns of reforms in the future are uncertain. 
A second argument concerning the sign of the impact of structural reforms on current 
account balances is propagated by Kennedy and Sløk (2005: 9). They argue that, in a first 
step, wages and prices decline as result of structural reforms. Hence, the country receives a 
price advantage and exports increase and imports decline. As a result, the current account 
balance improves in the short run. Profitability increases with a time lag and the internal 
interest rate increases. Investment goes up and foreign capital is attracted which, in turn, tends 
to reduce capital exports and, therefore, goods exports. In the long run, the current account 
surplus should thus decline. This theory therefore refers to the competitiveness approach of 
current accounts (see section 2.1.). 
Bertola and Lo Prete (2009) analyse the effects of rising income growth and income risk 
as result of labour market deregulation. They argue in the same vein as Kennedy and Sløk 
(2005) that labour market deregulation should improve the current account balance of the - 16 - 
reforming country without much delay, since forward-looking individuals increase their 
precautionary savings because of higher uninsurable risk. Another explanation for rising 
current account balances is that purchasing power shifts towards individuals with higher 
saving propensities. 
Hence, the impact of structural reforms on the current account balance is a priori not clear. 
However, up to now the majority of available empirical results for developed countries 
(Kennedy and Sløk 2005; Bertola and Lo Prete 2009) points at a current account improving 
effect of structural reforms. In this paper, we would like to scrutinize this pattern for the case 
of intra-euro area current account imbalances. 
3.2. Structural reforms 
Governments might be trying to lower huge current account deficits. By doing this, structural 
reforms can play an important role in reducing intra-euro area balances by increasing labour 
market flexibility and improving labour market institutions. In particular, the adequate choice 
of labour market institutions is crucial for a good labour market performance because it 
affects the reservation wage
6 and the wage bargaining power of employees (Arpaia and 
Mourree 2005, Nickell and Layard 1993). High labour market flexibility increases the 
responsiveness of the labour market to competitiveness (section 2.1) and therefore the current 
account balance.  
A radical straightforward reform strategy is to relax employment protection and to reduce 
unemployment benefits. First, less employment protection increases employers' flexibility 
when responding to changes in demand via lay-offs. This reduces workers’ bargaining power 
and facilitates wage cuts in the face of recession. Second, lower unemployment benefits raise 
the incentive of unemployed labour force to accept jobs at a lower wage because the 
reservation wage as the implicit minimum wage is reduced. This in turn lowers prices for 
labour-intensive and low technology production as unit labour costs fall (see section 2.3.).  
Lower wages reduce production costs and prices, which might accelerate exports and shift 
demand from imports to domestic products. In particular, in a monetary union lower 
employment protection necessitates wage flexibility because monetary policy cannot address 
idiosyncratic shocks. The adjustment speed increases and unemployment can be avoided 
(Blanchard 2007).  
                                                
6 As defined as the lowest wage at which workers accept a particular type of job. - 17 - 
Nevertheless, reducing labour protection may not be the best response to current account 
deficits. The European Commission (EC 2006) argues that given more flexible labour 
markets, volatility of unemployment rises with indeterminate effects on structural 
unemployment over the business cycle. Yet, structural reforms should assure an adjustment of 
current account balances by keeping unemployment low. In this context, Acemoglu and 
Shimer (2000) show that risk averse workers tend to accept lower wages in return for a higher 
employment probability which encourages enterprises to create low wage and low 
productivity jobs. Both, structural unemployment and overall productivity decline (see also 
Arapaia and Mourre 2005). In contrast, more generous unemployment benefits can influence 
productivity positively by creating more capital-intensive jobs (Acemoglu 2001).  
To address these caveats, structural reforms could be supported by productivity 
improvement, for instance by active labour market policies such as better education and 
training to arrive at a skilled labour force. Unemployed labour could be re-trained for a 
changed labour market demand. This argument corresponds with the European Commission's 
flexicurity approach which asks member states to improve labour market flexibility (wages 
and mobility), to balance employment protection and security in the labour market, as well as 
active labour market policy (EC 2007). Through this mechanism, rising productivity lowers 
production costs and improves the current account balance. 
Beyond the pure labour market focus, also product market deregulation tends to increase 
adjustment pressure as the responsiveness of prices and wages to changes in the market 
environment increases (Bayoumi et al. 2004). The European single market program has 
already increased competition by streamlining the regulations in the EU tradable sector and 
dismantling trade barriers such as tariffs and exchange rate fluctuations. However, 
competition in the non-tradable sector is still limited (EC 2007) and national price levels have 
tended to diverge rather than to converge (Deutsche Bundesbank 2009). The effect of product 
market deregulation is not overall clear. On the one hand, more intense competition could 
reduce prices and would hence lead to a current account improvement. On the other hand, 
product market deregulation might lower the entry-thresholds of foreign competitors to the 
domestic market, which could in turn worsen the current account balance (Kennedy and Sløk 
2005). 
Even if needed quite pressingly, structural reforms nevertheless tend to be delayed by 
political reform costs and/or a relaxed budget constraint. Political reform costs are arising for 
instance from opposition by insiders and/or outsiders (Saint-Paul 2004; Alesina et al. 2006). - 18 - 
Employed labour force opposes labour market reforms as rents in form of a high reservation 
wage are lost. The government faces protests and strikes as most prominently experienced in 
France. In this context, as politicians are concerned about their re-election, the time 
asymmetry of reform costs and benefits matters. Costs of reforms (in terms of voters’ 
discontent) arise immediately but benefits are reaped in the future, possibly after elections 
(Conesa and Garriga 2003).  
The upshot is that politicians tend to postpone reforms and try to fight rising 
unemployment resulting from low competitiveness or current account deficits by fiscal 
expansion. The opposition against additional government debt is less, as costs imposed by 
higher taxes or higher inflation are postponed after elections. This ability to postpone reforms 
via higher government expenditure is lower in times of economic downturns when the 
resources for fiscal expansion are depleted (Drazen and Grilli 1993). Then political groups 
will more easily accept reforms as costs of non-reforming are more evident and room for 
fiscal expansion is small. Additionally, the common currency in the euro area disables the 
escape route of monetary expansion and devaluation to adjust current account deficits 
temporarily (Belke et al. 2006a, Bertola 2008). Governments are forced to reform which 
refers to the “there is no alternative” (TINA) argument. In contrast, bail-outs of single EMU 
members and outright government bond purchases by the ECB would be equivalent of 
postponing national reform efforts. 
3.3. Private sector adjustment 
In contrast to the government, the private sector generally tends to adjust earlier to declining 
exports or rising import competition because of its tighter budget constraint. As declining 
exports and/or rising import competition translate into lower or negative profit margins, 
pressure by shareholders and capital lenders forces private enterprises to restructure. Usually, 
the main pillar of such private adjustment will be cutting unit labour costs, which may 
incorporate a larger capital stock, better technology, less employment and/or lower wages. 
With flexible labour markets, wage costs can easily be adjusted within the wage bargaining 
process. In contrast, inflexible labour markets force private enterprises to lay off workers. 
However, the current account balance should improve under both scenarios. There are several 
ways of restructuring.  
First, the private sector can increase productivity by substituting capital for labour. In this 
case, wage costs per unit of output, i.e. unit labour costs, typically decline but, at the same - 19 - 
time, unemployment tends to increase. Figure 4 shows the difference in the degree of 
substitution of labour by capital, henceforth called labour-capital substitution, between 
Germany and Italy as well as the real exchange rate and the bilateral trade balance between 
both countries since 1992. As shown by the downward-sloped smoothed bold line, Germany, 
for instance, substituted more capital for labour than Italy. This gap was especially large in 
the 1990s. 
Germany suffered from a strong real appreciation of the Deutschmark in the late 1980s and 
during its unification boom which deteriorated the German trade balance. A faster speed of 
labour-capital substitution helped to restore the German economy, as indicated by the real 
depreciation and the improved trade account. After the introduction of the euro in 1999, 
relative labour-capital substitution continued which can best be interpreted as the response to 
an overvalued entry of the mark into the monetary union (EC 2008). The rise of the German 
current account surplus continued until the financial crisis started in mid-2007 and even 
accelerated in 2008, when substantial competitiveness gaps within the euro area became 
apparent by rising spreads on euro area countries’ government bonds.  
Second, one possibility to cut unit labour costs is by international outsourcing of labour-
intensive production via FDI (offshoring)
7 and/or importing labour-intensive intermediates 
(Farrell 2004). For instance, Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) estimate that offshoring 
intermediate good(s) production contributed significantly to overall productivity growth in 
Italy. For Germany, Sinn (2004) coined the concept of a Bazaar economy, arguing that 
German manufacturers have extensively made use of offshoring and imports of intermediates, 
leading to unprecedented trade surpluses. Hence, the share of imported intermediate goods 
rose to over 50 percent of export values in 2007 (Sinn 2007). Companies have increased their 
competitiveness by reducing firm unit labour cost at the cost of domestic manufacturing 
employment (Farrell 2004; Sinn 2007).
8  
                                                
7 According to IMF (2007: 164), offshoring or offshore outsourcing is defined by the movement of parts of 
production to less costly foreign locations.
8 However, Welfens and Borbely (2009) partly reject the Sinn hypothesis, referring to an input-output analysis 
according to which the national outsourcing effect is in some cases economically more important than the 
international outsourcing effect.  - 20 - 
Figure 4 - Labour-capital substitution and the real exchange rate



















































































































































Labour-Capital-Substitution, Difference Germany-Italy HP-filtered (l.h.s.)
German Trade Account against Italy, in Percent of German GDP (l.h.s.)
Real Exchange Rate Italy/Germany based on ULC (r.h.s.)
Source: European Commission, AMECO and own calculation based on IMF, IFS and OECD, EO. 
To summarize, both private market adjustment and structural reforms have the potential to 
reduce intra-euro area balances via more flexible labour markets. Unit labour cost moderation 
at the firm level is the main driving force of the adjustment process. Both structural reforms 
and private market adjustment should lead to a rather similar outcome with respect to current 
account balances, but impose different costs in terms of political reform costs or 
unemployment. However, structural reforms influence the degree of labour market flexibility 
and therefore determine how current account balances will adjust by setting the "rules of 
adjustment". Flexible labour markets allow direct relative wage adjustment. In contrast, rigid 
labour markets force the private sector to adjust via labour-capital substitution and/or 
offshoring.
10
                                                
9 As a real exchange rate variable we use a rate based on unit labour costs, which is highly correlated with a CPI 
based real exchange rate variable. In Figure 5, an appreciation corresponds to an increase of the index. - 21 - 
4. Empirical analysis 
Taking our analysis in sections 2 and 3 as a starting point, we now proceed by empirically 
testing for the impact of private market adjustment and structural reforms on the current 
account balances of the euro area member countries. For this purpose, we employ an up-to -
date dynamic panel estimation framework. During this exercise, we also assess the empirical 
significance of potential interdependencies (complementarity vs. substitutability) within both 
processes towards more flexibility - structural reforms and private market adjustment. 
Because private market adjustment is probably endogenous with respect to structural reforms, 
we lay special emphasis on one direction of this interrelation, namely the question whether 
the degree of structural reforms has a specific impact on the relation among current account 
imbalances and private market adjustment. To be more specific, we test the following three 
hypotheses: 
1. Structural reforms and private market adjustment affect current account balances.
This hypothesis suggests a significant impact of both measures in promoting current 
account balance adjustment as described in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
2. Structural reforms modify the characteristics of the current account adjustment 
process. Here we test, whether structural reforms and private market adjustment are 
interdependent in a sense, i.e. are complements or substitutes with regard to their 
impact on the current account balance. 
3. The effectiveness of structural reforms and private market adjustment has been 
affected by the start of European Monetary Union (EMU). Here, we take the OCA 
literature as a starting point suggesting that EMU has reinforced the need for structural 
reforms and, hence, their effectiveness is higher from 1999 on. 
4.1. Data and variables  
We estimate the impact of private market adjustment and structural reforms on current 
account balances in the euro area based on a dynamic panel of bilateral yearly differences of 
11 euro area countries.
11 As we measure current account balances in percent of GDP, we can 
use the full matrix. The sample period covers the period from 1991 to 2007. Since we work 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Note that negative employment effects in home country emerge in case of horizontal and vertical integration 
of multinational enterprises as well as in the case of outsourcing especially in the low-skilled sector. If labor 
markets are rigid in these segments, structural unemployment tends to emerge.  - 22 - 
with annual data, we arrive at a maximum number of 1870 observations. Due to missing data, 
the sample in the end even becomes a little smaller. 
Current account balances 
As our research focuses on intra-euro area current account balances, we use bilateral trade 
account balances (TAB)
12, in percent of national GDP. As usual, structural reforms are 
assumed to promote exports and/or to decrease imports as the domestic competitiveness rises. 
Due to a lack of data, we cannot include trade in services or bilateral current account 
balances. We control for business cycle effects and nominal price effects by adding private 
consumption
13 and export price inflation. 
Structural reforms 
The measurement of structural reforms is not easy and its discussion fills many pages. We 
follow empirical papers on structural reforms (e.g. Belke et al. 2006a) and use the (difference 
of the) Fraser Index of Economic Freedom of the World as indicator of the intensity of 
structural reforms
14. The index measures economic freedom cardinally taking values in the 
range of 1 to 10, with higher values indicating a higher degree of economic freedom. An 
advantage of this index is the disaggregation according to different policy areas. However, the 
drawback is that annual data are only available from the year 2000 on. In our empirical 
investigation we decided to make use of the summary index (FI) as well as of the labour 
market sub-index (FI_labor). 
In a second step, we use the following two macroeconomic variables as proxies of 
structural reforms and assume that these macroeconomic indicators proportionally display the 
effects of accumulated previous structural reforms. The advantage of this method is twofold. 
First, these indicators are available for a longer period, and, second, the macro variables might 
serve as instrumental variables of some sort because private adjustment is endogenous with 
respect to the degree of structural reforms. Thereby, these macroeconomic variables might 
indicate long-term effects of structural reform. 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 
12 Bilateral current account data are generally not available. 
13 Here, we use the change in private consumption as the latter might have a direct impact on the trade balance 
and it is highly correlated with real GDP growth. 
14 For details of the computation of the index see Gwartney and Lawson (2003).  - 23 - 
As a first macro variable, we use structural unemployment as measured by the non-
accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) which is the unemployment rate 
consistent with constant wage inflation and which reflects structural imbalances in labour 
markets. However, calculations on structural unemployment depend on the estimation concept 
used. We include calculations of the NAWRU from the European Commission. We assume 
that declining structural unemployment is due to (past) structural labour market reforms. 
As a second macro variable, social benefits (SB) in percent of GDP are used as a proxy of 
cumulated past structural reforms of the welfare system, especially unemployment 
compensation. Large social benefits are associated with moral hazard and inefficient 
allocation of public transfers. Additionally, social benefits can act as an implicit minimum 
wage. A reduction of social benefits increases the pressure for wage moderation by boosting 
the incentive of unemployed to accept job offers at lower wages. Both, lower structural 
unemployment and lower social benefits are assumed to be correlated with an increase in 
current account balances.  
To enhance the coherence and readability of our estimation results we finally multiply both 
macroeconomic proxies with (-1). After this transformation, higher realisations of (-
1)*NAWRU or (-1)*SB proportionally correspond to a higher degree of structural reforms. In 
accordance with Bertola and Lo Prete (2009), we expect both proxies to be positively 
correlated with the bilateral trade balance.  
Private restructuring 
To measure private restructuring we use six different proxies. First, private market 
adjustment, such as increasing productivity or wage moderation, target unit labour costs, 
which are seen as an important determinant of competitiveness and might therefore affect 
current account balances. Hence, we apply changes in unit labour costs (ULC) as a proxy of 
private restructuring of the enterprise sector. Second, we use the nominal compensation rate
(NCR) which measures wage costs including fringe benefits
15. Again, both indicators are 
multiplied by (-1). Third, we test for the impact of productivity (PROD) and, fourth, the 
                                                
15  Compensation includes employer’s contribution to statutory social security schemes or to private funded 
social insurance schemes and unfunded employee social benefits paid by employers (such as children's, spouse's 
or payments made to workers because of illness, accidental injury). - 24 - 
degree of labour-capital-substitution (LABCAP) on the trade account. These latter two 
variables are of course not multiplied by the factor (-1) by the same logic as applied above. 
Our fifth and the sixth measure of the extent of private restructuring consist of a proxy for 
offshoring and an indicator of technological competitiveness. In any case, it is rather difficult 
to find an undisputed proxy for offshoring. Offshoring is in most cases measured at a highly 
disaggregated level. For example, IMF (2007) and Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) use input-
output data for their analyses; Goerg et al. (2008) base their empirical analysis on plant level 
data. Neither data set fits for our analysis since data are not available for all countries during 
the observation period. Therefore, we use as fifth variable outward FDI in percent of GDP as 
a proxy of offshoring, based on the assumption that offshoring as proxy for private 
restructuring is associated with increasing outward FDI. This approach excludes offshoring 
that is not linked to FDI such as outsourcing of services to firms abroad or increasing imports 
of intermediate products.  
Sixth, we measure technological competitiveness by making use of the Balassa index of 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa 1965), which accounts for a relative export 
share in an industry compared to all countries.
16 We calculate the RCA indicator for ten 
industries of each country and aggregate over industries by classifying all industries according 
to the kind of technology used. In so doing, we multiply the RCA variable by 1 for higher 
technology industries and by -1 in case of lower technology industries.
17 The differentiation in 
“higher technology (high and medium-high technology)” and “lower technology (low and 
medium-low technology)” follows Baumann and di Mauro (2007: 23). Our final ranking of 
countries with respect to the industrial specialisation is quite similar to that gained by 
Baumann and di Mauro (2007).  
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17 Industry 9 (ITS-SITC Rev.3: “Commodities and Transactions, n.e.s.”) is multiplied by 0 as it cannot be 
explicitly classified as a lower or higher technology branch.  - 25 - 
Control variables 
To control for business cycle effects in bilateral trade data we use private consumption, as is 
standard in this type of literature. Additionally, private consumption accounts for differences 
in consumption of euro area countries that might have driven the current account balances. 
Since nominal trade account data are also influenced by nominal prices, we check for relative 
price developments by employing a variable measuring relative export price inflation. We 
have to drop import price inflation due to mulitcolinearity. Finally, a dummy variable 
accounts for a possible structural break at the start of EMU. The dummy is coded as one for 
all years in which a country is member of the EMU and is otherwise set to zero. 
4.3. Empirical model 
To analyse the impact of structural reforms and market adjustment on current account 
balances, we use three differently specified regression equations. In the following, we give 
some details about each of the three different specifications. Let us start with hypothesis one. 
We test the validity of our first hypothesis claiming that structural reforms and private market 
adjustment affect current account balances by means of the following regression equation: 
(1)  t k, k t k, d t k, X t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   d  X  G  P  L  C   C + + + + + + + + = − − , 

























C . The indices i and  j  identify the countries involved, t denotes 
time, and k  is the cross-section index of country pairs.  t k P ,  represents the vector of proxies 
for private market adjustment,  t k G ,  stands for a vector of proxies for structural reforms, and 
t k X ,  captures a set of control variables. In our dynamic model setting, we also include the 
one-period lagged dependent variable as well as the level of the trade account balance (L) 
prevailing in the previous period to account for the degree of initial problem pressure. We 
expect that the higher a trade deficit turns out to be, the larger the probability of structural 
reforms or private restructuring is, as the need for adjustment is especially pronounced. The 
vectors  t k P , ,  t k G ,  and  t k X ,  contain the change in the bilateral absolute differences between 
country i and  j , with: - 26 - 
(2a)  ( ) t j t i t k P P P , , , Δ − Δ =
(2b)  ( ) t j t i t k G G G , , , Δ − Δ =
(2c)  ( ) t j t i t k X X X , , , Δ − Δ = . 
This variable transformation generates stationary time series to avoid spurious regression. 
Panel unit-root tests (Levin et al. 2002; Im et al. 2003) for the transformed variables reject 
non-stationary nature of all independent variables. The dummy variable d  controls for the 
impact of EMU on competitiveness. We account for unobserved heterogeneity using cross-
section fixed effects  k ε .  t k, μ  is the white noise error term.  
Hypothesis one is corroborated if the coefficient  G β  of structural reforms, FI, FI_labor, (-
1) NAWRU and (-1) SB, reveals a positive sign. This would indicate that structural reforms in 
a country tend to enhance bilateral trade balances. The estimated coefficients of private 
market adjustment,  P β , are expected to have a positive sign, too. Let us now proceed with the 
specification of the regression equation related to our hypothesis two. The latter actually 
claims that structural reforms influence the private adjustment process. For this purpose, we 
scrutinize the interrelations between market adjustment and structural reforms via adding an 
interaction term  t k t k G P , , . This yields:  
(3)     t k, k t k, d t k, X t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   d  X  G  P  L  C   C + + + + + + + + + = − − k,t k,t A G P 
This specification enables us to test whether the relationship between the dependent 
variable  t k C ,  and the independent variable  t k P ,  is influenced by the third independent variable 
t k G,  (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). Such interaction effects can be isolated by product terms of 
the independent variable  t k P ,  (the so-called focal variable) and the second independent 
variable  t k G ,  (moderator variable). Note, that the interpretation of regression coefficients 
changes in this case. With respect to our own estimation exercise the interpretation of 
regression coefficients can be summarized as follows (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003):  P β  captures 
the effect of  t k P ,  on  t k C ,  when  0 , = t k G ,  G β  estimates the effect of  t k G,  on  t k C ,  when - 27 - 
0 , = t k P , and  A β  indicates the number of units that  P β  increases/decreases if  t k G ,  grows by 
one unit.
18
Generally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that structural reforms affect the private 
adjustment process if  A β  becomes statistically significant. If the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction between structural reforms and private restructuring  A β  has (not) the same sign as 
the estimated coefficient of private adjustment,  P β , then it indicates a complementary 
(substitutive) relationship between structural reforms and private restructuring. Let us now 
finally derive the regression framework to test our third hypothesis. 
Our third hypothesis maintains that the effectiveness of private market adjustment and 
structural reforms to balance current accounts has been affected by membership of the 
respective country in EMU. We decided to test the former by adding an interaction term 
t k t k d P , ,  which interrelates private market adjustment with the EMU dummy variable or an 
interaction term  t k t k d G , ,  measuring the impact of EMU on the effectiveness of structural 
reforms in influencing current account balances. In this case, the regression equations boil 
down to be the following: 
(4a)    t k, k t k, d t k, X 1 t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   d  X  G  P  L  C   C + + + + + + + + + = − − k,t k,t A d P 
(4b)    t k, k t k, d t k, X 2 t k, G t k, P 1 t k, 2 1 t k, 1 0 t k,   d  X  G  P  L  C   C + + + + + + + + + = − − k,t k,t A d G 
Based on these specifications, we estimate the effect of EMU membership on the impact of 
private market adjustment and structural reforms on current account balances. Positive signs 
of the estimated coefficients  1 A β  and  2 A β  indicate a rising importance of private market 
adjustment or of structural reforms for current account balances since the start of the EMU. 
We estimate the three specifications (1), (3) and (4) based on a dynamic panel model by 
means of a System-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998) to 
account for possible endogenous variables, fixed effects and heteroskedasticity. In contrast to 
the Difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991), the System-GMM addresses poor 
performance of first-differenced-variable instruments. Our data set fits the requirement of a 
relatively small time dimension (max. 17 points in time) and many cross sections (110 
                                                
18 The contrary explanation is possible:  A β  indicates the number of units that  g β  increases/decreases if  t k P ,
grows by one unit. However, we assume in our theory that structural reforms affect the private adjustment 
process.  - 28 - 
country pairs) which has originally been raised in the context of the Arellano-Bond procedure. 
We hold the number of instruments at a minimum to enhance the discriminating power of 
post-estimation over-identification tests. However, time lags are large enough to account for 
long-term adjustment. All variables are assumed to be endogenous with respect to the 
dependent variable except the EMU dummy, which we treat as exogenous for obvious 
reasons. The presented results in the tables are derived from robust two-step estimations, 
which have been corrected for potential bias of standard errors due to small sample size 
(Windmeijer 2005).  
In order to arrive at a valid model specification the null hypotheses of the Arellano-Bond 
AR(2) correlation test
19 and the Hansen over-identification test (Hansen 1982) have to be 
rejected. As we use a robust estimation, the Sargan over-identification test (Sargan 1958) 
becomes inconsistent (Roodman 2006: 12). Hence, we only report the empirical realisations 
of the Hansen test statistic. To check for the validity of our model specification, we also 
perform specifications, which include additional time dummies (Roodman 2006). That 
improves the autocorrelation tests and the robustness of standard errors.
20 As the overall 
pattern of our results is untouched by this specification, only results based on specifications 
excluding deterministic time dummies are reported. 
4.4. Estimation results 
Test of hypothesis 1: Do structural reforms and private market adjustment affect current 
account balances? 
Our estimation results related to our first hypothesis are reported in Table 1 for the Fraser 
summary index, in Table 2 for the Fraser labour market sub-index, in Table 3 for the macro 
variable structural unemployment and in Table 4 for the macro indicator social benefits.  
In general, the estimated coefficients of the variables measuring the impact of private 
market adjustment on bilateral trade balances turn out to be of rather low significance. Only 
the coefficients of FDI (column 5), productivity (column 3), and the nominal compensation 
rate (column 7) are significant at the common levels. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of 
                                                
19 It is important to note that the absence of AR(2) is the necessary condition for unbiased and efficient 
estimation with GMM-SYS, but not of AR(1). First order residual autocorrelation in the starting equation is no 
problem since the estimators work with first differences. Hence, the significance of AR(1) autocorrelation does 
not limit the validity of our results. 
20 We use time dummies to make the assumption of no autocorrelation across individuals in the idiosyncratic 
disturbances more likely to hold (Roodman 2006). - 29 - 
structural reforms turn out to be positive and significant in almost all estimations. Especially, 
a relative increase in the overall as well as in the labour market-specific Fraser Index and a 
reduction of structural unemployment relative to the partner country is linked to an 
improvement of the bilateral trade balance. 
The estimated coefficients of the macroeconomic control variables are in accordance with 
theory and, thus, corroborate the robustness of our estimation results. For instance, a relative 
increase in private consumption and and relatively lower export prices reduce the (nominal 
value of the) bilateral trade balance. The estimated coefficients of the EMU dummy (Table 3 
and 4) are in several cases significant and display a positive sign. This clear empirical pattern 
reflects that after the start of EMU, bilateral trade balances in the majority of countries 
declined more rapidly. In short, this mirrors the development of intra-euro zone current 
account balances since 1999 between Germany as a net creditor country and Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, France and Ireland as net debtor countries.  
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that in general structural reforms and, only in 
some cases, also private market adjustment tends to increase the trade balance. The weaker 
evidence for private market adjustment might reflect the fact that private capital inflows (from 
Germany) and public capital inflows (from EU institutions) allowed to postpone private 
restructuring in the majority of euro area member countries. Hence, our results confirm 
empirical research of Kennedy and Sløk (2005) and Bertola and Lo Prete (2009). - 30 - 
Table 1 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural reforms 
(Fraser summary index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 123456
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate -0.012
adjustment (0.517)










structural  Fraser Index (summary index) 0.085** 0.074** 0.081** 0.090** -0.151 0.076
reforms (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.189) (0.050)
macro  trade balance -0.287*** -0.264*** -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.017 -0.377***
variables (t-1) (0.079) (0.082) (0.072) (0.078) (0.172) (0.076)
trade balance 0.090** 0.068** 0.076* 0.072* -0.008 0.161*
(t-1) (0.040) (0.029) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.081)
 private consumption -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)
 export prices 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.044* 0.018*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010)
EMU dummy
constant -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019 -0.020
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.019)
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification instruments 23 23 23 23 18 23
AR (2) 0.699 0.584 0.734 0.747 0.225 0.710
Hansen (p-value) 0.580 0.486 0.549 0.343 0.849 0.053
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 2 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural reforms 
(Fraser labour market sub-index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006) 
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 7 8 9 10 11 12
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.070
adjustment (0.478)










structural  Fraser Index (labor market) 0.016** 0.010 0.013* 0.018** -0.051* 0.008
reforms (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.028) (0.010)
macro  trade balance -0.250*** -0.241*** -0.266*** -0.274*** -0.097 -0.368***
variables (t-1) (0.090) (0.085) (0.079) (0.089) (0.120 (0.077)
trade balance 0.075* 0.061 0.072 0.065 -0.018 0.130**
(t-1) (0.043) (0.039) (0.048) (0.042) (0.044) (0.065)
 private consumption -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.014* -0.011 -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
 export prices 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.026* 0.019*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
EMU dummy
constant -0.013 -0.016 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 -0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23
AR (2) 0.487 0.470 0.607 0.704 0.264 0.738
Hansen (p-value) 0.853 0.731 0.729 0.242 0.933 0.063
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 31 - 
Table 3 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 1 31 41 51 61 71 8
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.436
adjustment (0.309)










structural  (-1)*structural unemployment 0.037* 0.037** 0.047** 0.035*** 0.067* 0.029
reforms (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.035) (0.019)
macro  trade balance -0.141* -0.189*** -0.164** -0.154** -0.187** -0.244***
variables (t-1) (0.072) (0.070) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.065)
trade balance 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.059***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
 private consumption -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
 export prices 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.015 -0.023** -0.019 -0.022 -0.039* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010)
constant 0.003 0.016* 0.007 0.010 0.026 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 26 30 30 27 28 25
AR (2) 0.962 0.627 0.801 0.869 0.217 0.403
Hansen (p-value) 0.638 0.526 0.400 0.647 0.216 0.630
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 4 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and social benefits on 
bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 1 92 02 12 22 32 4
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.568*
adjustment (0.309)










structural  (-1)*social benefits 0.012* 0.013** 0.012** 0.009 0.027** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
macro  trade balance -0.143* -0.192*** -0.152* -0.137* -0.201*** -0.251***
variables (t-1) (0.078) (0.070) (0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.061)
trade balance 0.017 0.026 0.021 -0.014 0.011 0.066***
(t-1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015)
 private consumption -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
 export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.013 -0.018* -0.012 -0.022* -0.027** -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
constant 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1520
specification instruments 27 32 26 28 28 26
AR (2) 0.943 0.615 0.854 0.962 0.188 0.367
Hansen (p-value) 0.513 0.145 0.447 0.385 0.216 0.402
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 32 - 
Test of hypothesis 2: Reforms as a propagation mechanism fostering the impact of private 
adjustment on the current account balance? 
The estimation results related to our second hypothesis are displayed in Tables 5 and 6 for 
structural unemployment and social benefits as our indicators of the degree of structural 
reforms. Estimations using Fraser Index variables do not deliver any significant interaction 
term and are not reported. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term between private 
market adjustment and structural reforms are reported in the grey highlighted rows. Some 
coefficients of the interaction terms are significant with a negative sign, suggesting a 
substitutive relationship. Since the estimated  A β  in case of a negative sign of  A β  indicates 
the number of units that  P β decreases if  t k G ,  grows by one unit, a straightforward 
interpretation is that a higher degree of structural reforms diminishes the impact of private 
adjustment on the current account balance. In other words, less structural reforms require 
more private market adjustment and vice versa. An alternative interpretation is that private 
market adjustment mechanisms are not needed as pressingly any more if structural reforms, 
for instance in the area of social benefits, are conducted.  
However, if we measure private market adjustment via FDI we find a complementary 
relationship (Table 6, column 35). In this case, we feel legitimized to conclude that structural 
reforms foster the effectiveness of FDI to increase the current account balance. Notably, the 
described pattern of results is not dependent on whether we consider an interaction with social 
benefits or with structural unemployment as an indicator of the reform intensity, which again 
stresses the robustness of our results.  
Seen on the whole, thus, our estimation results indicate that we cannot reject our second 
hypothesis if we measure the degree of reforms by structural unemployment and, 
alternatively, by means of a social benefit variable. Structural reforms tend to influence the 
current account adjustment process. More specifically, we find mainly substitutive 
relationships between structural reforms and private market adjustment. - 33 - 
Table 5 – Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and structural unemployment on 
bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007) 
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 2 52 62 72 82 93 0
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.518*
adjustment (0.287)










structural  (-1)*structural unemployment 0.044** 0.039** 0.058*** 0.033* 0.081** 0.029
reforms (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.021)
interaction term -0.574* -0.004* 0.004 -0.030* 0.005 0.000
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.314) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001)
macro  trade balance -0.176*** -0.187*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.187** -0.241***
variables (t-1) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066)
trade balance 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.061***
(t-1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
 private consumption -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
 export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.021* -0.022** -0.024* -0.016 -0.036* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009)
constant 0.011 0.013* 0.016* 0.003 0.022 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 32 36 32 50 34 30
AR (2) 0.721 0.640 0.572 0.521 0.219 0.425
Hansen (p-value) 0.497 0.594 0.412 0.215 0.254 0.806
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 6 – Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and social benefits on bilateral 
trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007) 
dependent variable  bilateral trade balance
# 3 13 23 33 43 53 6
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.632**
adjustment (0.325)










structural  (-1)*social benefits 0.009 0.018** 0.011* 0.009 0.031** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
interaction term -0.383** -0.001 -0.005 -0.008* 0.012* -0.001
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.194) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
macro  trade balance -0.147* -0.132 -0.182** -0.132* -0.209*** -0.252***
variables (t-1) (0.080) (0.098) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.059)
trade balance 0.017 0.010 0.022 -0.009 0.012 0.065***
(t-1) (0.017) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015)
 private consumption -0.007** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.045) (0.004) (0.003)
 export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.009 -0.010 -0.015 -0.031** -0.020 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009)
constant 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.014 -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 30 25 30 29 34 30
AR (2) 0.910 0.977 0.664 0.986 0.180 0.357
Hansen (p-value) 0.610 0.201 0.286 0.462 0.208 0.511
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 34 - 
Test of hypothesis 3: Has the effectiveness of structural reforms and private market 
adjustment been affected by EMU? 
The estimation results based on regression equations designed to check the validity of our 
third (EMU) hypothesis are reported in the Tables 7 and 8.
21 Again, the rows referring to the 
significance of interaction terms are highlighted in grey. The estimated coefficients for the 
interaction between private market adjustment and the EMU dummy are almost entirely 
insignificant. This suggests that EMU had virtually no influence on the impact of private 
adjustment on current account balances. Only if the degree of market adjustment is measured 
by the RCA variable, the interaction terms (column 48, Table 7, and column 60, Table 8) 
become significant and reveal a negative sign, indicating that the effectiveness of increasing 
share of high technology goods to improve current accounts has dropped since the start of the 
EMU. That might be a hint, that price competition has become more important since start of 
the EMU. 
These weak results gained for private market adjustment are in strong contrast to those 
based on the degree of structural reforms, at least if the latter is proxied by structural 
unemployment. The coefficients for the interaction of structural unemployment with the EMU 
dummy are clearly negative and mostly significant. This suggests that in some cases since the 
start of EMU the effectiveness of structural reforms to improve current accounts declined in 
most euro area countries. This could indicate that - as was often argued with respect to EMU - 
the so-called up-front costs of structural reforms might be larger within a currency union. This 
holds especially in large, relatively closed countries for which changes in the nominal 
exchange rate are not so effective in alleviating the necessary “crowding-in” effect. Removing 
restrictions in financial markets tend to stimulate demand more than labour market reforms 
and hence allow an easier and quicker “crowding-in” of reforms (Duval and Elmeskov, 2005: 
6-7). 
However, using the social benefit variable instead of structural unemployment as a proxy 
of structural reforms, the estimated coefficients of the interaction term reveal a positive sign 
but at low significance levels. This conveys weak evidence in favour of a higher effectiveness 
of structural reforms after the start of EMU in fostering the adjustment of trade balances 
(Table 8, column 41). Seen on the whole, however, the evidence of either a positive or a 
                                                
21 As the Fraser Index is available at annual frequency not earlier than from 2000 on, we can, again, only provide 
estimation results for structural unemployment and social benefits. - 35 - 
negative impact of EMU on the effectiveness of reforms in improving current account 
balances appears to be overall weak.  
4.5. Robustness checks 
In macroeconomic applications with a low number of cross-sections a finite sample problem 
emerges: the estimation results based on the System-GMM estimator might depend on the 
specific choice of instruments. Therefore, we check our results as a complement by means of 
bias-corrected dynamic fixed effect least square dummy variable estimations (LSDV) with a 
boot-strap variance-covariance matrix (Bruno 2005). This method uses the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator to correct biased standard errors to avoid the Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). This 
method might lead to a potentially better finite-sample performance than the System-GMM 
estimator which we used in the previous section. 
As examples, we display the corresponding results for the Fraser Summary Index in 
Table 9 and for social benefits in Tables 10 and 11.
22 Overall, the LSDV results confirm our 
results gained using the System-GMM estimation procedure (see Tables 1, 4, and 6). The 
signs of the estimated coefficients generally remain the same. While private market 
adjustment seems to have virtually no impact on current account balances, relative structural 
reforms, in contrast, tend to improve the bilateral trade balance. The substitutive relationship 
between structural reforms and market adjustment is only weakly confirmed by this 
estimation procedure. Finally, we again find little evidence of an interaction between 
structural reforms or market adjustment with the EMU dummy. Hence, we do not report these 
results.  
Second, we check for nonlinearities in the effect of structural reforms on the current 
account balance. Thereby, we use squared values of the empirical realisations of our structural 
reform variable.
23 Non-linearities might emerge either because the underlying relationships 
are non-linear (the so-called “Calmfors-Driffill hump” (Calmfors et. al. 1988; Belke et al. 
2006b; Duval and Elmeskov 2005; Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005)) because of the possibility 
that a given reform may have different impact on labour markets depending on the initial 
policy stance in the area considered (Duval and Elmeskov 2005, 13) or because the 
                                                
22 Our results based on equations containing the Fraser labour market sub-index and the variable “structural 
unemployment” as an indicator of structural reforms confirm our results gained earlier with System-GMM and 
are available on request. 
23 Figures are squared. However, the sign remains the same to keep the relationship.  - 36 - 
sequencing of goods and labor market reforms plays a significant role (policy 
complementarity, Alesina et al. 2008). Another rationale might be that some factors, such as 
capital and labor, may face non-linear adjustment costs and irreversibilities in case of no 
reforms and, hence, reforms - by lowering fixed costs of adjustment - also lead to non- linear 
effects and reform shifts may take various periods to affect current account imbalances. By 
using the Fraser Index values or social benefits as indicator for structural reforms, the 
coefficients of the structural reform and the private adjustment variables and their squares are 
not statistically significant at conventional critical values. However, coefficients for structural 
reforms become significant if we use structural unemployment as proxy for structural 
reforms. That indicates a non-linear relationship between structural unemployment and 
current account balances (Table 12). As the interaction terms are overall not significant, we 
do not report the respective tables. 
Third, we add the bilateral change in GDP per capita as a control variable. By this, we 
account for the wealth effect on the current account balance as proposed by the inter-temporal 
current account approach (see section 3.1). According to the latter, low-income countries are 
associated with current account deficits and high-income countries with current account 
surpluses. A relative increase in GDP per capita should therefore lead to an improved current 
account. Tables 13 and 14 provide the results of the System-GMM estimations of the GDP 
(per capita) augmented equation to test our hypotheses one and two for the case of structural 
unemployment as our macroeconomic proxy of structural reform. Again, this estimation 
specification confirms our baseline results. However, any significance of interaction effects 
between structural reforms and market adjustment disappears. Relative GDP per capita is in 
general insignificant, a result which casts some doubt on its role in explaining the intra-euro 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 - 39 - 
Table 9 – Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and 
structural reforms (Fraser summary index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 6 16 26 36 46 56 6
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 1.966***
adjustment (0.268)










structural  Fraser Index (summary index) 0.126*** 0.112* 0.115*** 0.094*** 0.070 0.099***
reforms (0.007) (0.061) (0.030) (0.028) (0.070) (0.029)
macro  trade balance -0.069*** -0.072** -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.018 -0.067***
variables (t-1) (0.008) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009) (0.031) (0.004)
trade balance -0.546*** -0.545*** -0.546*** -0.556*** -0.783*** -0.596***
(t-1) (0.011) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.013)
 private consumption -0.035*** -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
 export prices 0.008*** 0.007 0.009** 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 10 – Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and 
social benefits on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 6 76 86 97 07 17 2
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.196
adjustment (0.354)










structural  (-1)*social benefits 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.061*** 0.027***
reforms (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.027) (0.004) (0.005)
macro  trade balance -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.060*** -0.103***
variables (t-1) (0.011) (0.002) (0.017) (0.019) (0.006) (0.017)
trade balance -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.327*** -0.179***
(t-1) (0.022) (0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010)
 private consumption -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
 export prices 0.008* 0.008*** 0.008** 0.009** 0.017*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.026* -0.029*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.052*** -0.023***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007)
model N 1652 1730 1730 1730 1396 1512
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 40 - 
Table 11 – Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and social 
benefits on bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007) 
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 7 37 47 57 67 77 8
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.192
adjustment (0.162)










structural  (-1)*social benefits 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.061*** 0.026***
reforms (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003)
interaction term -0.299*** -0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.002*** 0.000
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.082) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.000) (0.035)
macro  trade balance -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.060*** 0.103***
variables (t-1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
trade balance -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.328*** -0.179***
(t-1) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.010) (0.022)
 private consumption -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.024*** -0.027*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
 export prices 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006)
EMU dummy -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008)
model N 1652 1730 1730 1730 1396 1512
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 12 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and non-linear structural 
unemployment on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 7 98 08 18 28 38 4
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate -0.388*
adjustment (0.205)










structural  (-1)*structural unemployment
2 0.020* 0.025* 0.026** 0.029*** 0.036 0.014
reforms (0.012) (0.13) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011)
macro  trade balance -0.138* -0.188** 0.150* 0.188* -0.213*** -0.245***
variables (t-1) (0.079) (0.083) (0.087) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071)
trade balance 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.057***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
 private consumption -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
 export prices 0.005** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.010 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.035* -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011)
constant 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.022 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 26 26 26 26 26 26
AR (2) 0.968 0.656 0.898 0.871 0.161 0.417
Hansen (p-value) 0.582 0.189 0.307 0.309 0.071 0.281
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 41 - 
Table 13 – Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural 
unemployment on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 8 58 68 78 88 99 0
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.035
adjustment (0.432)










structural  (-1)*structural unemployment 0.050* 0.040** 0.071*** 0.071** 0.061 0.003
reforms (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.064) (0.025)
macro  trade balance 0.101 0.088 0.040 0.113 0.214 0.033
variables (t-1) (0.137) (0.133) (0.141) (0.155) (0.147) (0.181)
trade balance 0.037* 0.030** 0.038*** 0.039** 0.003 0.055***
(t-1) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018)
 private consumption -0.014* -0.004 -0.013* -0.012 -0.010 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
 export prices 0.006 0.010* 0.006 0.010 0.029*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
 GDP per capita -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.015 -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
EMU dummy -0.005 -0.016 -0.004 -0.009 -0.035* -0.017
(0.011 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)
constant 0.003 0.015* 0.007 0.010 0.025 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
s p e c i f i c a t i o n i n s t r u m e n t s 2 32 32 32 32 32 3
AR (2) 0.424 0.426 0.504 0.388 0.289 0.523
Hansen (p-value) 0.282 0.450 0.554 0.543 0.393 0.241
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  
Table 14 – Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and structural unemployment on 
bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007)
dependent variable:  bilateral trade balance
# 9 19 29 39 49 59 6
market   (-1)*nominal compensation rate -0.396**
adjustment (0.195)










structural  (-1)*structural unemployment 0.047* 0.038* 0.054*** 0.045** 0.080* 0.013
reforms (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.043) (0.018)
interaction term -0.333 -0.002 -0.001 -0.016 0.003 0.001
(market adjustment*structural reforms) (0.343) (0.002) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.001)
macro  trade balance -0.171** -0.178** -0.176** -0.195*** -0.214*** -0.237***
variables (t-1) (0.070) (0.076) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071)
trade balance 0.017 0.023* 0.020 0.023* 0.012 0.055***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016)
 private consumption -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
 export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
 GDP per capita 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.051** -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009)
constant 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.037** 0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.187) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 34 34 34 34 34 34
AR (2) 0.730 0.697 0.711 0.607 0.164 0.471
Hansen (p-value) 0.316 0.403 0.502 0.307 0.060 0.725
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level.  - 42 - 
5. Policy implications 
This paper has assessed the adjustment process in the euro area in the light of rising intra-euro 
area current account balances. For this purpose, we investigated in particular the impact of 
structural reforms and private market adjustment on intra-euro area balances. Our estimation 
results for euro area countries confirm only in some cases a small significant impact of private 
market adjustment on bilateral trade balances. In contrast, structural reforms overall tend to 
improve intra-euro area current accounts, with labour market flexibility turning out to be a 
crucial determinant in this process. Hence, we clearly confirm the empirical results of 
Kennedy and Sløk (2005) as well as Bertola and Lo Prete (2009) for the euro area and have to 
reject the hypothesis that structural reforms will first lead to a worsening of the current 
accounts balance. We also find substitutive relationships among market adjustment and 
structural reforms. The latter imply that, without structural reforms, private market adjustment 
such as relative wage cuts is necessary to improve current accounts. However, there is some 
evidence that in euro area countries the effectiveness of structural reforms to foster the 
adjustment of current accounts has diminished since the start of EMU. 
      Overall, thus, our empirical results strongly support the potential benefits of structural 
labour market reforms in countries with large intra-euro area current account deficits. 
Referring to our empirical results, we therefore tend to join Gros (2009) and Gros et al. (2005) 
and argue in contrast to De Grauwe (2009b, c) that the only way out of the dilemma is to stick 
to the reform path already taken by the stronger reformer countries as, e.g. Germany, within 
the euro area. It is apparent that Germany is the country least affected by the crisis in Europe. 
The German export led model might not have prevented (possibly only temporarily) a sharp 
fall in GDP, but it seems to have provided a much more stable background for its consumers 
and workers than the housing bubble led economies of, for instance, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. Obviously, the countries suffering most durably from the financial and economic crisis 
are those which relied too much on private and public debt in order to stimulate domestic 
demand. But, as the recent experience with Greece has clearly shown, the chickens come 
home to roost and those countries are presented the bill which, however, most probably will 
be passed on to other EU countries as well. Hence, re-gaining competitiveness is certainly no 
zero-sum game for Europe, especially with an eye on sound public finances, technological 
progress, innovation and general competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Borbély 
2006). - 43 - 
     Given  the  substantial  intra-euro  area current account imbalances, reforms should be 
implemented as soon and steady as possible. The necessary adjustment process will be painful 
but then pass through to a timely economic recovery and less long-term unemployment. The 
alternative would be a long-lasting period of high and painful unemployment as experienced 
by Germany after its reunification. In this context, reform pressure and enacting reforms are 
unlikely to lead to a race to the bottom with respect to wage cuts, leading to a deflationary 
spiral. Instead, intra-euro area current account balances would diminish and the international 
competitiveness of Europe as a whole would rise, as the competition among wage setters and 
politicians is reinforced. This in turn could also strengthen, for instance, the role of the euro as 
a reserve currency vis-à-vis the dollar. Moreover, this scenario neither calls for further steps 
towards political union nor for a coordination or centralization of wage policies at a 
supranational level. Finally, it clarifies that any notion of a European Economic Government 
should include the fight against euro area internal imbalances and to go for fiscal 
consolidation. Political union which turns to be a transfer union would be counter-productive 
- not least because in this case, the former hard-currency countries would finally leave the 
euro area. 
Sustaining wage rigidities in under-performing euro area countries in order to stimulate 
domestic demand would not prevent these countries from turning into deflation. Instead, it 
would finally lead to lower domestic demand and higher current account balances within the 
euro area by destroying domestic employment. This, in turn, is likely to strengthen economic 
nationalism and therefore the likelihood of a break-up of the euro area. The recent example of 
Greece is highly illuminating in this respect. Hence, in order to safeguard the European 
integration process, we should believe in markets (again) and put the emphasis of our political 
efforts on shaping incentives to enact structural reforms. 
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Annex  
I. Data sources 
Data   Source 
FDI IMF,  IFS. 
GDP  OECD, Economic Outlook Database and IMF, World 
Economic Outlook Database. 
GDP per capita  IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
INV OECD,  Economic  Outlook Database. 
labour-capital substitution  European Commission, AMECO Database. 
structural unemployment 
(AMECO data) 
European Commission, AMECO Database. 
nominal compensation rate  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
private consumption  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
productivity OECD,  Economic Outlook Database. 
social benefits  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 
bilateral trade balances, trade 
data for RCA 
OECD, ITCS International Trade by Commodities 
Statistics, Rev. 3, Vol. 2007 Release 1. 
export price inflation  OECD, Economic Outlook Database. 